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CIVIL PROCEDURE-INTRA-MILITARY
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE APPLIES TO DUAL
STATUS TECHNICIANS-ZURESS V DONLEY, 606

F.3D 1249 (9TH CIR. 2010)
Due to the sensitive nature of military activities, the intra-military
immunity doctrine has long prevented members of the military from
bringing actions against the government or military personnel.' In recent
years, courts have considered whether the intra-military immunity doctrine
will apply with the same force to dual status technicians ("DSTs") as
members of the military who do not hold a civilian position, following the
enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
("1997 Amendments"). 2 In Zuress v. Donley,3 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the 1997 Amendments granted DSTs
standing to bring Title VII claims against the government and other
military personnel. 4 The Ninth Circuit held that the 1997 Amendments did
not change the application of the intra-military immunity doctrine as
applied to DSTs when the challenged personnel actions are "integrally
related" to the unique structure of the military.5
Lisa M. Zuress served as a dual status Air Force Reserve

See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (granting government immunity under
Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA") if injury is incident to service); see also Hodge v. Dalton, 107
F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating members of armed forces barred from bringing suit against
government). See generally Jonathan Turley, Pax Afilitaris: The Feres Doctrine and the
Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1, 6 (2003) (discussing Court's creation of protection for military from criminal prosecution and
civil litigation). Following the Civil War, the American military expanded from a small operation
with limited duties into a much larger and separate military society. Id. The Court believed that
military separateness was a necessity to military readiness. Id. Therefore, the Court provided the
military with a number of protections and exemptions in its governing system. Id. See also infra
note 15 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of intra -military immunity doctrine).
2 See Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1995) (examining whether DSTs may file
Title VII suit); see also William E. Brown, Dual Status National Guard Technicians Should Be
Barredftom Bringing Civil Suits Under Title VII, 199 MIL. L. REv. 89, 90 (2009) (explaining
Title VII protection as applied to DSTs left up to courts). The National Guard Military
Discrimination Complaint System ("NGMDCS") provides an avenue for injured service members
to file discrimination claims when their claims are barred in federal courts. See Brown, supra, at
90.
3 606 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2010).
4 Id. at 1250.
5 Id. at 1254-55 (declining to adopt standard set forth by federal circuit).

276

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVI

Technician at Luke Air Force Base in Glendale, Arizona.6 As a DST,
Zuress held two positions while being employed at Luke Air Force Base,
one position in a civilian capacity and another position in a military
capacity.7 In 2003, Zuress sent a letter to Defense Department officials
alleging inappropriate sexual behavior by other members of her group."
After sending the letter and agreeing to serve as a character witness,
Zuress's superiors began to treat her unfairly. 9 Following two "average"
performance reports, Zuress realized that she would not be promoted and

was therefore forced into retirement. 10
After retiring, Zuress claimed that the Air Force violated her rights
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")." The United
States District Court of Arizona dismissed her complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 12 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that
the 1997 Amendments were not the "clear statement . . . required from
Congress to override [the] settled judicial doctrine of intra-military
immunity."' 3

In Feres v. United States,14 the Court held members of the Armed
Id. at 1252 (explaining Zuress held position from July 2000 to June 2005).
Id. (detailing Zuress's employment positions). Zuress's civilian position was as a GS-12
Operations Staff Specialist for the 944th Operations Group, and her military position was as an
Air Force Reserve Captain in the 944th Operations Group. Id. Zuress held both positions to
fulfill the requirement that all Air Force or Army technicians must maintain membership in the
Air Force or Army Reserve. Id. at 1251.
8 Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1252 (explaining circumstances surrounding letter). After Zuress sent
the letter to the Defense Department, she also agreed to appear as a character witness in a
coworker's discrimination suit. Id. As a result, Zuress claimed that the inappropriate sexual
behavior intensified. Id.
9 Id. at 1252 (discussing breadth of unfair treatment Zuress received). For example, Zuress's
former military commander failed to return her salutes after she sent the letter. Id. Similarly, her
supervisors blocked any chance of promotion by giving her two "average" performance reviews.
Id.
10 Id. (describing military's promotion procedures). The military forces any officer who on
two occasions fails to receive a promotion into retirement. See id. Furthermore, though Zuress
also held a civilian position, her retirement from the military would result in her losing the
civilian position as well. Id.
11 Id. (discussing nature of complaint filed in federal district court). In her complaint, Zuress
named Michael B. Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, as the only defendant. Id. at 1249. Zuress
claimed that her superiors violated her rights when they failed to promote her, temporarily
detailed her to a lower-grade position, failed to extend her military retirement date, and forced her
into retirement. Id. at 1252.
12 Id. (explaining basis for district court dismissal). Zuress conceded that the challenged
personnel actions were "integrally related to the military's unique structure," but argued that the
1997 Amendments supported her claim. See id. at 1254.
13 See Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1254-55.
14 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
6

7
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Forces could not sue the government for injuries arising from their military
duty.' 5 Courts have routinely denied suits against government and military
personnel that would force the judiciary to examine the "established
relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior
officers.' 6 This result is true despite some harsh and unfair results because
lower courts are bound by the Court's precedent. 17 Both the sensitive
15 See id. at 146 (stating holding of case). Feres consolidated three cases involving suits by
members of the military against the United States for claims under the FTCA. See id. at 136-37.
All three plaintiffs' alleged negligence by members of their respective military branches. Id. The
Court held that the FTCA did not extend to members of the military for wrongs incident to their
military service. Id. at 146; see also Turley, supra note 1, at 7 (noting intra-military immunity
developed as a judicially created doctrine). As far back as the Civil War, ranks of the military
and members of the Supreme Court viewed military separateness as an integral part of military
readiness. Turley, supra note 1, at 6. In one of its first expansions of military immunity, the
Court included combat injuries and noncombat injuries as "incident to service." Id. at 8-9. This
expansion set the stage for the judicial system's muddled attempt to define what injuries are
"incident to service." Id. at 9.
16 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (extending doctrine barring claim brought
by enlisted Navy personnel for racial discrimination); see United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681,
691-92 (1987) (extending doctrine barring claim brought by widow of pilot against civilian
employees of federal government); Gonzalez v. Dep't of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 930-31 (9th
Cir. 1983) (reaffirming doctrine extends to bar claims brought for specific alleged constitutional
violations); see also Robert Cooley, Note, Afethod to This Madness: Acknowledging the
Legitimate Rationale Behind the Feres Doctrine, 68 B.U. L. REV. 981, 990 (1988) (stating
military discipline main rationale remains from Feres doctrine). Strict discipline and regulation
within the military continues to be indispensable for the effective operation of our armed forces.
Cooley, supra, at 990. In Chappell, the Court stated, "[c]ivilian courts must, at the very least,
hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established
relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at
the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the military establishment." 462 U.S. at 300;
Edwin F. Hornbrook & Eugene J. Kirschbaum, The Feres Doctrine: Here Today Gone
Tomorrow?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1990) (stating concerns regarding military effectiveness).
The issue of military effectiveness includes numerous concerns:
[T]he crucial importance of military effectiveness to national security; the risk to
military effectiveness posed by judicial interference; the potential danger to military
discipline posed by the litigation process; the difficulty of measuring when and how
much military discipline is deteriorating; and the difficulty of designing a bright line
rule to protect the interests of both national security and individual soldiers.
Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra, at 11. But see United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113
(1954) (distinguishing between injuries arising outside course of military duty and those within
military duty). In Brown, the plaintiff suffered bodily injuries causing him to be honorably
discharged from the Armed Services. Id. at 110. However, he suffered the injuries at issue
several years following his discharge as the result of a negligently conducted operation by the
Veterans Administration. Id. at 110-11. The Court drew a line in its holding between "injuries
that [do] and injuries that [do] not arise out of or in the course of military duty," the latter being
the type of injury that when reviewed, does not impede military effectiveness. Id. at 113.
17 See Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1983) (admitting harsh result of
case). The court noted that children of service members should not have to suffer, but that

278

SUFFOLKJOURNtAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVI

nature of military personnel relationships and the unique structure of the
military require courts to uphold this time-honored doctrine."'
Additionally, courts have pointed to alternative remedies available to
plaintiffs provided by Congress and within the structure of the military
itself.19
In O 'Brien v. United States,0 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth

nonetheless, the court is handcuffed by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Id. at 99; see Scales
v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining intra -military immunity applies to
cases brought by dependents of service members); see also John Astley, Note, United States v.
Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New Life and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 185, 185

(1988) (noting injustice of intra-military immunity doctrine).
18 See Brown, 348 U.S. at 112 (articulating relationship between soldiers and superiors
provides necessity for barring some FTCA suits); see also United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52,
57-59 (1985) (noting case would require judicial review of sensitive military affairs); Chappell,
462 U.S. at 300 (cautioning against examination of hierarchical relationships within military);
Stauber v. Cline, 837 F.2d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining claims would require judiciary to
examine "sensitive military affairs"); Mattos v. United States, 412 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir. 1969)
("It is judicial intrusion into the area of military performance that is sought to be avoided."). The
examination of military discipline requires special regulations. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
Without strict discipline and special regulations affecting judicial review, the military would lack
the ability to function at the necessary capacity. Id. But see Turley, supra note 1, at 17-18
(highlighting military discipline rationale lacks evidentiary support for broad application of intra military immunity). Although military discipline is the most self -evident rationale, it is too broad
and could hypothetically encompass any aspect of military life. Id. at 17. Furthermore, courts
have never found any empirical evidence that allowing challenges would hinder military
effectiveness. Id. at 17-18.
19 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 145 (showing compensation received by soldiers comparable to
most workers' compensation statutes); see also Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 929-30 (noting plaintiff
exhausted internal military remedies and court reluctant to review). After termination from the
military, the military reinstated and retroactively promoted the plaintiff to the rank of major.
Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 930. The plaintiff had sought an earlier retroactive date, but the court
denied review of the military's internal decision. Id.; see also Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (explaining claim allowance would frustrate essential
element of Veterans' Benefits Act). The Court noted that one of the essential elements of the
military compensation scheme includes an upper limit for service-connected injuries. Stencel
Aero Eng'g Corp., 431 U.S. at 673. The Court then went on to state that, "'[t]o
permit
(petitioner) to proceed ... here would be to judicially admit at the back door that which has been
legislatively turned away at the front door."' Id. (quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802
(1972)); see also Brown, supra note 2, at 108 (outlining adequacy of NGMDCS in providing
complainants with compensation absent Title VII action). When the NGMDCS approves a
discrimination complaint, the commanding officers must take action to remedy the unlawful acts
of discrimination. See Brown, supra note 2, at 113-14. The procedure for a complaint filed with
the NGMDCS is very similar to a claim filed in a civilian court system. Id. The complainant
may appeal a claim to a hierarchy of supervisors if he/she is not satisfied with the initial result,
much like the appeals procedure in the civilian court system. Id.The National Guard Bureau
issues the final decision in the appeals process and thus protects complainants' due process rights.
Id. at 114; see also Astley, supra note 17, at 208 (noting alternative compensation schemes
available for service members).
20 192 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1951).

2011]

ZURESS V. DONLEY

Circuit held that the doctrine of intra-military immunity applies to members
of the military reserves ("reservists"). 21 However, courts have established
outer limits to the doctrine, emphasizing that the tortious conduct at issue
must be incident to military service; when this is not the case, the claim
should move forward.2 2 The key question courts ask when deciding
whether to apply the doctrine of intra-military 2immunity
is if the judiciary
3
would have to second-guess military decisions?

21 See id. at 950-51 (applying intra-military immunity doctrine to member of United States
Naval Reserve).
22 See Lutz v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991) (limiting
application of doctrine when conduct not incident to service). In Lutz, the injured plaintiff
claimed defamation after her subordinates broke into her office, stole personal property, and
distributed it. Id. at 1479. The material implicated the plaintiff's involvement in a lesbian
relationship. Id. Despite the fact that all individuals involved were active members of the
military, entrenched in the sensitive hierarchical structure of the military, the Ninth Circuit held
the doctrine did not apply because the conduct was "not incident to service." Id. at 1488; see also
Bledsoe v. Webb, 839 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply doctrine to civilian
plaintiff employed by military department). In Bledsoe, the military denied its civilian employee
entry onto the naval ship on which she was required to perform electrical technician services.
Bledsoe, 839 F.2d at 1358. The court concluded that the military officer's decision to deny the
plaintiff access to the boat was not "inherently military." Id. at 1360; see also Astley, supra note
17, at 216-17 (explaining post-Feres decisions focus on whether suit threatens unique and
sensitive structure of military).
Astley demonstrates that courts have begun to recognize
situations in which an FTCA claim by military personnel should proceed when the suit has no
bearing on military effectiveness. Astely, supra note 17, at 186-87. Any court denying a claim
brought by a service member must show that military discipline or decision making would be
threatened by allowing the claim to proceed. Id. at 217. For a court to properly conduct this
analysis it must acknowledge all the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violation.
Id.
23 See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57 (explaining cases must be examined on case-by-case basis
applying Feres and its progeny). The Court stated:
The Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be
examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and subsequent cases.
Here, the Court of Appeals placed great weight on the fact that Private Shearer was off
duty and away from the base when he was murdered. But the situs of the murder is not
nearly as important as whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess
military decisions and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court pointed out that allowing this suit would require officers of the
military to testify about management and disciplinary decisions. Id. at 58-59; see also Brown,
supra note 2, at 98-101 (outlining judiciary's continued hesitation in examining relationship
between military personnel). Hesitation persists when examination of the alleged conduct would
result in a disruption to the order and discipline of the military. Brown, supra note 2, at 101.
Allowing the court to entertain such suits and interfere with the relationships of service members
and their superiors would be a substantial blow to the unique structure of the military
establishment. Id.; see also Astley, supra note 17, at 187 (advocating claims by military
personnel if second-guessing of military decisions not required by judiciary).
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In Mier v.Owens,24 the Ninth Circuit held that military promotion
is a personnel action which is "integrally related" to the military's unique
structure and, therefore, the doctrine applies, barring suit.2 5 In 1997,
Congress amended the National Defense Authorization Act to clarify the
previous definition of DSTs.26 Although most courts have held that the
1997 Amendments did not change the application of the intra-military
immunity doctrine to DSTs, the Federal Circuit in Jentofi v.United States2 7
interpreted the amendments to grant DSTs standing to bring any action
against the government as civilian employees. 28 The key issue facing the
courts in interpreting the 1997 Amendments is whether it was the
"unmistakable terms" necessary from Congress to grant DSTs standing as
federal civilian employees for "any other provision of law," including those
times when serving in their military capacity. 29
In Zuress, the Ninth Circuit faced the question of whether the 1997
Amendments superseded the doctrine of intra-military immunity and
granted DSTs unequivocal civilian status to bring suits against the
government.3 0 The Zuress court examined the statutory provisions giving
consideration to the pre-existing intra-military immunity precedent.3" The
Ninth Circuit highlighted the long history of protecting the intra-military
24

57 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1995).

25

See id. at 751.

In Alier, the plaintiff experienced repeated discrimination, was

subsequently suspended from his civilian job, and in turn did not receive a promotion. Id. The
court stated that promotional decisions within the military are central to the military's hierarchy
and not amenable to review by a civilian court. Id.
26 10 U.S.C.A. § 10216 Military Technicians (dual status) (West 1997), amended by Ike
Skeleton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 124
Stat. 4137. The statute provides that, "[f]or purposes of this section and any other provision of
law, a military technician (dual status) is a Federal civilian employee." Id.
27 450 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
28 See Jentoft, 450 F.3d at 1348-49. Compare Wetherill v. Geren, 616 F.3d 789, 796 (8th
Cir. 2010) (holding DSTs do not have standing when conduct at issue incident to military service
position), and Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 367-68 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding status of
military technicians as civilian employees not changed by 1997 Amendments), and Walch v.
Adjutant Gens. Dep't, 533 F.3d 289, 300 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding military technicians were
considered civilian employees since 1968 and amendments did not change this), with Jentoft, 450
F.3d at 1348-49 (holding DSTs have unconditional civilian status to bring claims against military
and military personnel).
29 See Wetherill, 616 F.3d at 795 (noting Congress would have been more direct if intended
"doctrinal revolution"); Williams, 533 F.3d at 367 (noting ambiguity in 1997 Amendments). In
Williams, the court noted the inconsistency between the language stating that DSTs are federal
civilian employees for "any other provision of law," but requiring DSTs serve as reservists.
Williams, 533 F.3d at 366. But see Jentoft, 450 F.3d at 1348-49 (holding no language in 1997
Amendments limited when D STs regarded as federal civilian employees).
30 Zuress v. Donley, 606 F.3d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating issue on appeal).
31 Id. at 1253.
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immunity doctrine from statutory and common law challenges.3 2 Next, the
court explained that under the "unmistakable terms" test, "'if Congress had
intended for [Title VII] to apply to the uniformed personnel of the various
armed services, it would have said so in unmistakable terms. "'33
The Ninth Circuit next considered whether the phrase "any other
provision of law" demonstrated "clear Congressional intent" for DSTs to
be regarded as civilian employees when filing any claim against the
military.3 4 The court reasoned that nothing had changed about the DST
position after the 1997 Amendments, explaining DSTs still held hybrid
positions.35 The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the legislative history of
the 1997 Amendments to show that Congress intended that the
amendments only clarify the inconsistencies used to refer to DSTs, not to
affect settled case law.3 6 The Ninth Circuit held that the 1997 Amendments
32

See id.; see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text (outlining expansion of

doctrine through history).
33 See Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1253 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Alexander, 572
F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978)) (approving Eighth Circuit's observation that Congress must
clearly intend Title VII apply to DSTs); see also Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1995)
(applying "unmistakable terms" test to determine whether National Guard Technicians Act
applies to DSTs); Gonzalez v. Dep't of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining
Congress must clearly state intention for Title VII to apply to military personnel).
34 See Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1254.
35 Id.; see Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining requirement
of DSTs to maintain service in military reserves). The Fifth Circuit pointed to the fact that DSTs
must still hold a position in the military reserves. Williams, 533 F.3d at 367. Allowing civilian
status for Title VII suits would require courts to intrude on the exact military personnel decisions
which the doctrine of intra-military immunity protects. Id.; see also Walch v. Adjutant Gens.
Dep't of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 300 (5th Cir. 2008) (articulating DSTs have been classified as
federal civilian employees since 1968 National Guard Technicians Act). The Fifth Circuit
explained that DSTs have always been considered federal civilian employees and that the 1997
Amendments did nothing to change this fact. Id. The Fifth Circuit explained that the Feres'
principles still applied and prevented DSTs from bringing Title VII claims when the conduct at
issue was "integrally related to the military's unique structure." Id. at 299 (quoting Brown v.
United States, 227 F.3d 295, 299 n.5 (5th Cir. 2000)).
36 Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1255. A House Report for the 1997 Amendments explained:
The National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 and the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 enacted provisions defining the term
"military technician" which were not completely consistent with one another. This
section would remove the inconsistencies by defining a military technician (dual
status) as a federal civilian employee who is hired . . . and who, as a condition of
federal civilian employment, must maintain military membership in the selected
reserve, and who also must be assigned to a position as a technician in the
administration and training of the selected reserve, or to a position in the maintenance
and repair of supplies or equipment issued to the selective reserve or armed forces.
The section would also require that, unless exempted by law, all military technicians ..
• would be required to maintain military membership in the selected reserve unit by
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did not require a reexamination of prior precedent and
Zuress was therefore
37
barred from bringing the action against the military.
The Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the plain meaning of
the statute was ambiguous and therefore required further analysis. 8 Due to
the ambiguity of the text contained in the 1997 Amendments, the statute
must be examined in light of prior case law and its legislative history.3 9
The Ninth Circuit gave immense weight to the long history of courts
protecting the intra-military immunity doctrine. 40 Supporting its decision
to bar Zuress's suit, the Ninth Circuit went on to note that numerous cases
have expanded upon the doctrine since its judicial inception in Feres.4'
The Ninth Circuit focused mainly on cases that have expanded on
the doctrine, but the court did not abandon precedent in which the conduct
at issue was not incident to the injured service member's military service. 42
While many of the lawsuits barred by the doctrine appear to lead to harsh
and unjust results, the Ninth Circuit reinforced that these results are

necessary to preserve the most efficient and effective military.43
Furthermore, there are many remedies for injured service members within
the military system itself that lead to very similar outcomes or may even
exceed those remedies which are available in the civilian court system. 44
which they are employed as a military technician ....
H.R. REP. No. 105-132, at 358 (1997) (citations omitted).
37 Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1255.
38 See Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1254-55 (requiring court to proceed with statutory analysis looking
at case law and legislative history). The Ninth Circuit explains that there is a long history of
protecting the doctrine of intra-military immunity. Id. at 1253. The court goes on to conclude
that if Congress intended to change this provision as applied to DSTs, they would have done so in
unmistakable terms. Id.
39 See, e.g., Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging necessity
of
unmistakable terms from Congress); Gonzalez v. Dep't of the Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir.
1983) (announcing Eighth Circuit's first reference to unmistakable terms test); Johnson v.
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978) (introducing unmistakable terms test regarding
whether Congress intended service members to bring suit).
40 Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1253 (listing cases that guarded intra-military immunity doctrine); see
also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987) (barring suit brought by widow);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (barring racial discrimination suit); Stauber v.
Cline, 837 F.2d 395, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1988) (barring suit for harassment under incident to service
rationale); Gonzalez, 718 F.2d at 930-31 (barring suit brought for constitutional violation).
41 Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1253 (citing various suits barred by doctrine); see also supra
note 16
and accompanying text (showing breadth of cases barred by doctrine and supporting rationale).
42 See Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1253; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (highlighting
cases in which wrongful conduct not incident to military service).
43 See Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1253; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining
harsh and unjust results stem from Court's binding authority).
44 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (showing adequate remedies usually received by

2011]

ZURESS V. DONLEY

Judges are given a wealth of responsibility and power in the American
court system, but within this power should not be the ability to examine
and second-guess decisions made by our military leaders>.
The Ninth Circuit was correct when it refused to follow the
conclusion reached by its sister circuit in Jentoft, which determined that the
1997 Amendments were unambiguous and DSTs were unconditionally
federal civilian employees. 46 The notion that an erroneous result was
reached in Jentoft is further supported by the fact that other courts have
also refused to follow the result reached in Jentoff since the filing of
Zuressi. Offering support for the Ninth Circuit's holding, the House
Report for the 1997 Amendments states "[t]his section would remove the
inconsistencies" in the handful of different names used to refer to DSTs. 48
In Zuress v. Donley, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the 1997
Amendments to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act granted
DSTs standing as civilians, notwithstanding their service as reservists.
Following the determination that the language of the statute was
ambiguous, the Ninth Circuit relied on a long history of case law and the
legislative intent behind the 1997 Amendments in correctly affirming the
District Court of Arizona's decision.
The Ninth Circuit properly
determined what Congress intended in enacting the 1997 Amendments.
The court correctly upheld the application of the intra-military immunity
doctrine as applied to Dual Status Technicians to prevent judicial review of
military decision making.
J T. Baker

plaintiffs).
45 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (showing necessity of not second-guessing
military decisions by judiciary); see also Turley, supra note 1, at 6 (explaining consistent Court
support for rationale of military separateness from civilian justice system).
46 See Zuress v. Donley, 606 F.3d 1249, 1254 (disagreeing with Jentoft court that
1997
Amendments effected substantive change by Congress); see also supra note 35 and
accompanying text (explaining nothing changed about DSTs after 1997 Amendments). When the
conduct at issue is incident to military service, courts are determining that the same rationale for
applying the intra-military immunity doctrine holds firm even after the 1997 Amendments. See
also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47 See Wetherill v. Geren, 616 F.3d 789, 795 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to follow Jentoft
while agreeing with rationale of Zuress, Williams, and Walch).
48 See Zuress, 606 F.3d at 1254-55; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (quoting
House Report on 1997 Amendments).

